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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Michigan stands at a crossroads with respect to the way that electrical vehicles
(“EVs”) are sold and serviced. For many decades, Michigan—like many other states—mandated
that cars could be sold and serviced only through independent, franchised dealers and prohibited
car manufacturers from selling or servicing directly. Historically, those laws were put in place to
protect dealers from the superior bargaining power, and sometimes unfair practices, of the Big
Three car companies—General Motors (“GM”), Ford, and Chrysler.
With the advent of EV technology, it became clear that these decades-old
restrictions on direct sales and servicing needed to be reconsidered. Tesla, the first large-scale EV
company to market, made the case that direct sales and service were critical to EV market
penetration and the success of its business model. From about 2014 forward, many states began
to loosen their prohibitions on direct distribution to allow Tesla to operate. Michigan, however,
went in the opposite direction. A 2014 amendment to the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (“MVFA”),
passed under questionable circumstances, was intended to shut the door on any possibility that
Tesla could engage in direct sales or service in Michigan. While many other states were moving
forward, Michigan moved back.
Tesla filed a constitutional challenge to the 2014 amendment in federal court in the
Western District of Michigan. The court made clear that it would allow the case to proceed to trial.
In early 2020, Attorney General Nessel announced a settlement with Tesla that interpreted the
State’s dealer law to permit Tesla to engage in any aspect of marketing a vehicle—opening
showrooms, giving test drives, receiving trade-ins, setting up the sales transaction—so long as the
actual sales transaction was orchestrated out of state. It also interpreted the Michigan statute to
permit Tesla to open service centers, so long as it did so through a subsidiary. In effect, this
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interpretation of Michigan law allowed Tesla to sell and service its cars in Michigan, subject to
jumping a few formal hurdles.
By 2020, the EV sales issue was not just Tesla’s. Not only were most of the legacy
car companies beginning to roll out EVs, but a host of new EV start-ups—Rivian, Lordstown,
Lucid, Bollinger, Nikola, and others—were preparing to reach the market. These new EV startups join Tesla in arguing urgently for the need to sell and service their vehicles directly in order to
achieve critical mass and insist that traditional dealer distribution will not work for their business
model. Because they are similarly situated to Tesla, at present these companies can arguably take
advantage of the Tesla settlement and operate in Michigan as Tesla does.
Unfortunately, the car dealers’ lobby—which was behind the 2014 legislation—is
unhappy with any prospect of direct sales. In the fall of 2020, the dealers pushed a bill—H.B.
6233—in the Michigan legislature to “close the Tesla loophole.” The original version of the bill,
passed in committee, would have preserved the Tesla settlement, but prohibited other EV start-ups
from direct sales and service. The version of the bill changed through floor amendment and that
ultimately passed in the House went even further—it eviscerated the Tesla settlement and denied
direct sales or service to any car company, including Tesla. Fortunately, the Senate did not take
up the bill, and it died with the last legislative session.
It’s time for Michigan to adopt reform legislation to bring clarity to the question of
EV sales and to permit car companies to reach their customers directly. The rationales for such
reforms are many, and include:
(1) EV market penetration: For a variety of reasons, the traditional dealer model is
ill-suited to EV sales and service. Therefore, mandating EV sales and service
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through dealers will slow EVs’ market penetration and prevent the growth of
the EV sector.
(2) Environmental impact: Slowing EV market penetration means more internal
combustion vehicles on the road and more carbon emissions. A coalition of
environmental and electrification organizations including the Sierra Club,
Environmental Council, Electrification Coalition, Ecology Center, E2, Plugin
America, and Cleanfuels Michigan have prioritized direct sales reforms for this
reason.
(3) Consumer choice and consumer protection: A host of consumer protection
organizations, including the staff of the U.S. Federal Trade Commissions, the
Consumer Federation of America, and Consumer Action, Consumers for Auto
Reliability and Safety, and the American Antitrust Institute have argued that
prohibitions on direct vehicle sales are bad for car buyers, consumer choice,
and competition.
(4) Threats to the free market:

Restrictions on direct distribution tell a car

manufacturer that it may not sell its own products to willing buyers, and tell
consumers that they cannot choose how to buy a car. Free market organizations
like the Mackinac Center, Americans for Prosperity, and the Institute for Justice
have argued against these laws on the grounds that they unjustifiably interfere
with free markets and represent government regulation favoring special
interests.
(5) Economic impacts for the State of Michigan: The current system—in which EV
start-ups can sell cars directly to Michigan residents so long as they perform the
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sales transaction out of state—represents a potentially enormous economic cost
to the State. Lost sales, property, and other taxes may soon run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars. This scheme will also discourage investment
and employment in the state, and send a negative signal about Michigan’s
openness to automotive innovation and investment.
The case for legislative reform is clear. This White Paper concludes by presenting
two reform options—allowing direct sales and service by EV start-ups, or allowing direct sales
and service for any company selling EVs—and argues that the second option is fairer and more
workable.
BACKGROUND
1. Historical Background on Vehicle Direct Sales Prohibitions
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that there is an important sector of the
economy in which some states’ laws prohibit a company from selling its own products to
consumers or providing after-market service for those products. We are used to buying iPhones
from Apple, basketball shoes from Nike, cable services from Comcast, and houses from the
builders who make them. But, for many decades, car manufacturers have been subject to
prohibitions on selling their cars directly to consumers, or servicing them in the aftermarket.
Instead, many states’ laws require manufacturers to sell and service through independent
franchised dealers.
How did this come about? In the early years, of internal combustion vehicles, car
manufacturers used a wide variety of distribution methods, including dealer franchising, traveling
salesmen, consignment, direct sales through company-owned stores, and sales through general

4
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796359

5

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 177 [2021]

retailers. 1 Historically, there is nothing inevitable about dealer distribution as the exclusive means
of getting cars to customers. The present dealer-franchise system arose during the period between
1930 and 1950. At that time, the Big Three dominated car sales and dealers were mostly “mom
and pop” local businesses. The dealers complained that the Big Three took unfair advantage of
their unequal bargaining power to impose draconian contractual terms on the dealers. For
example, Henry Ford allegedly forced dealers to buy Model Ts that they could not sell under threat
of not getting any more inventory. The dealers also argued that the Big Three unfairly competed
against their own franchised dealers by offering lower prices at company-owned stores than
independent dealers could match.
The dealers ultimately persuaded most state legislatures to pass laws regulating the
automobile dealership relationship to protect the dealers (not consumers). Among the provisions
of most of these laws was a prohibition on the manufacturer opening its own showrooms and
service centers and thereby undermining its franchised dealers. Those direct distribution
prohibitions have mostly carried over until the last decade, when some states began to loosen them
in light of the changing economic, technological, and social landscape.
Even before coming to the novel distribution issues raised by EVs, it had become
clear in recent decades that the original dealer protection rationales for the direct distribution
prohibitions were waning. As noted, the dealers’ arguments for protection from the manufacturers
were based on two economic facts creating grossly unequal bargaining power: (1) car
manufacturing was a three-firm oligopoly with little competition among the Big Three on
franchising terms; and (2) car dealers were local, family-owned, mom and pop combinations. The

The historical information presented here is taken from Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the
Politics of Crony Capitalism, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 573 (2016), available at
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2720&context=articles.

1
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world is radically different today. First, there has been considerable new entry from foreign
competitors, making the car market much, much more competitive than it was in the mid-twentieth
century.

Car dealerships can now negotiate with around fifteen to twenty different car

manufacturers over potential dealership opportunities. Second, many car dealerships are no longer
mom and pops, but part of multi-billion dollar dealer groups. The Top 10 dealership groups in
America have annual revenues around $100 billion—more than any car company. 2 To put things
in perspective, that’s about one-fifth of Michigan’s GDP. Many of these large dealer groups
operate in Michigan. For example, the Suburban Collection based in Troy operates 47 dealerships
in Michigan and reported $2.6 billion in revenue in 2019. 3 Based on these economic changes, it
would be hard to argue that the inequality of bargaining power between manufacturers and dealers
is anything like what it was in the mid-twentieth century.
2. Tesla’s Entry—Nationwide Responses
When Tesla entered the market in 2013, it announced that it would be selling and
servicing its vehicles directly, and not employing franchised dealers at all. A customer buying a
Tesla buys the car directly from Tesla and has the vehicle serviced by Tesla. In testimony before
the Federal Trade Commission, Tesla explained that seven factors supported its rationale: 4
1) Dealership locations: Dealerships are usually found in out-of-the way
locations. Tesla feels it’s important to “bring the new technology to the
consumer” in places like shopping malls.

2
https://s3-prod.autonews.com/data-protected/032519-2019Top150DealershipGroups032519.pdf?djoDirectDownload=true.
3
Id.; see also https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000497.
4
https://evannex.com/blogs/news/74602181-tesla-defends-direct-sales-model-at-ftc-talks-cites-unfair-oppositionfrom-gm.
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2) Inventory differences: Large inventory is the lifeblood of traditional
dealerships, but Tesla works on a built-to-order model.
3) Longer sales cycles: The franchised dealer model is based on high volume of
fast-paced sales. EV buyers take longer to educate themselves on EV sales, and
therefore need to work with sales people who are working on a commission
model.
4) Different profit models: Traditional dealerships earn low profit margins on
new car sales, and make it up on service. EVs have a much smaller service
component since they don’t have service needs like oil changes or engine tuneups. Traditional dealerships therefore lack much of an incentive to sell EVs.
5) No advertising. Traditional dealerships rely on manufacturers to fund their
advertising in TV, radio, and print media. Tesla does not advertise.
6) Dealer price mark ups. Franchised dealers could not make money selling
Teslas, since they would have to mark them up, and therefore could not compete
with Teslas sold directly from the company.
7) Conflict of interest. EV sales cannibalize internal combustion sales, which are
the dealers’ lifeblood. Dealers therefore lack the motivation to sell EVs.
Tesla’s decision to sell direct and bypass dealers was not well-received by the car
dealers. Beginning in 2014, the dealers launched a state-by-state battle to block Tesla’s entry,
arguing that direct sales and service were prohibited by existing law. Over the course of the next
several years, these battles played out in state courts, motor vehicle commissions, and legislatures.
In some cases, they are still ongoing.
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Today, almost half of the states have eased their direct sales restrictions for EVs.
This has come about in several ways. Some states have held their existing dealer laws inapplicable
to EV companies that do not want to use franchised dealers at all. For example, in holding that the
dealers lack standing to challenge Tesla’s entry, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that is
dealer franchise law was intended to protect dealers in franchise relationships with manufacturers,
a circumstance inapplicable to Tesla that doesn’t want to use franchised dealers at all. 5 Similar
interpretations have occurred in Minnesota, Missouri, Arizona, and Rhode Island. Other states like
New Hampshire, Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado have passed new statutes opening the door to EV
direct sales. Some states have allowed direct EV sales on a limited basis. For example, in 2014,
the dealers and Tesla reached a compromise that allowed Tesla to open three stores in Ohio (that
today are frequented by Michigan residents). Virginia, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New
York, Georgia, and North Carolina similarly allow some direct EV sales. Finally, technologically
important states like California have never blocked direct EV sales at all.
Even states that prohibit direct EV sales and service cannot stop their residents from
buying EVs directly. Thus, in states like Michigan where direct EV sales have been prohibited
until recently, thousands of Michigan residents still purchased Teslas. If they were willing to
forego a test drive, they could buy the vehicle online and have it delivered. Or they could drive
across the border into Ohio and purchase a Tesla from our friendly rivals to the south. Servicing
has been more challenging. Since Tesla was, until recently, prohibited from opening a service
center in Michigan, this meant that Michigan customers either had to wait for a service technician
to come to their home or, again, drive to Ohio for service.

5

Massachusetts State Auto Dealers Ass’n v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 469 Mass. 67, 515 N.E.3d 1152 (2014).
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Residents of every state are buying EVs directly and having them serviced directly.
The question is not whether that happens—it has, does, and will—but whether customers have the
freedom and convenience of having that direct relationship with a manufacturer occur locally, or
whether they to drive to another state. A critical mass of states—with the numbers growing every
year—have decided to allow local sales and service.
3. 2014 Michigan Legislation
Like most other states, Michigan has long prohibited direct sales and service, with
the most recent version of its dealer protection statute dating back to 1977. 6 However, until 2014,
the statute was ambiguous as to whether it would apply to a company like Tesla that did not use
franchised dealers at all. The statute provided that a manufacturer shall “[s]ell any new motor
vehicle directly to a retail customer other than through its franchised dealers.” 7 The possessive its
was potentially significant—the statute assumed that a manufacturer had franchised dealers. If,
like Tesla, it did not, the Michigan courts might well have ruled the statute inapplicable.
In the fall of 2014, after the Massachusetts decision holding the Massachusetts
statute inapplicable to Tesla, the Michigan car dealers’ lobby became worried that the Michigan
statute might be construed in the same way. They therefore pushed a floor amendment to an
unrelated bill that struck the little word “its” from the statute. Many members of the Legislature
from both sides of the aisle subsequently explained that they had no idea that this was intended to
block Tesla—indeed, one member of the Legislature explained to me that he specifically asked,
and was told, untruthfully, that the excision of “its” had nothing to do with Tesla or direct sales.
Unfortunately, subsequent evidence would leave no doubt that this was the amendment’s intent

MICH. H. LEGIS. Analyis Section, SECOND ANALYSIS, H.B. 4738, 4740, at I ( 1-26-gg),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/1997-1998/billanalysis/House/pdf/ 1997-HIA-4738- B.pdf.
7
MICH. COMP. LAWS§445.1574(1) (i) (2013).
6

9
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/177
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796359

10

Crane:

and effect.

Following the 2014 legislation signed by Governor Snyder, Michigan law

unequivocally prohibited direct sales and service, effectively blocking Tesla from the State.
4. Tesla Constitutional Challenge and Settlement
At the time he signed the 2014 bill, Governor Snyder publicly stated that the issue
of vehicle direct sales needed to be comprehensively studied and reconsidered. Unfortunately,
after passing the anti-Tesla amendment, the Legislature never took up Governor Snyder’s
suggestion. In 2016, when it became clear that legislative reform was not forthcoming, Tesla filed
a constitutional challenge to MDOS’s 2015 denial of its application to operate a new vehicle
dealership and a used vehicle dealership, and to register a repair facility, in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Michigan. Tesla argued that this denial, occasioned by the 2014
legislative amendment, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
“dormant” or negative commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Over the
course of the next few years, discovery progressed in the case and, by 2020, the case was headed
for trial.
On January 22, 2020, Attorney General Nessel announced a settlement with Tesla
that essentially gave Tesla a full victory. 8 As the Attorney General explained, “[t]he stipulation
acknowledges that Tesla may: operate under existing Michigan law; sell cars to Michigan
customers as long as the sales contract indicates the sale took place in a state other than Michigan;
and, indirectly own service and repair facilities in Michigan through a subsidiary, Tesla Michigan.”
The Attorney General achieved this result by interpreting existing Michigan law narrowly. M.C.L.

8

https://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-359-92297_92299-517800--,00.html.
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§ 445.1574, which prohibits manufacturers from owning service centers, does not apply to
“indirect” ownership of a service center through a subsidiary. 9 Further:
•

No provision in M.C.L. § 445.1574(1) nor any other provision of Michigan law prohibits
Tesla from delivering vehicles to Michigan residents in Michigan (whether directly,
through a subsidiary, using an independent carrier, or otherwise), including assisting
them with vehicle trade-ins, so long as legal title for any vehicles sold by Tesla transfers
outside the state of Michigan, consistent with M.C.L. §§ 440.2106(1) and 440.2401; and

•

Neither M.C.L. § 445.1574(1)(h) nor § 445.1574(1)(i) nor any other provision of
Michigan law prohibits Tesla from operating one or more galleries in the State to educate
customers and facilitate transactions out-of-state so long as Tesla does not transfer legal
title to the vehicles within the State consistent with M.C.L. §§ 440.2106(1) and 440.2401.
Permissible activities at such a gallery include (but are not limited to) conducting
demonstration drives; discussing prices, service, financing, leasing, and trade-ins with
potential customers; helping potential customers configure a vehicle; facilitating ordering
and purchase of a vehicle for which legal title transfers out-of-state; and facilitating
customer transaction paperwork for a sale for which legal title transfers out-of-state
Stripped of legalese, this settlement meant that Tesla was free to do every action

associated with selling a car—offering test drives, quote prices and terms of sale, facilitating tradeins, configuring the vehicle, facilitating paperwork, and even delivering the car—in Michigan so
long as the sale transaction and transfer of title technically occurs outside of the State. A customer
can thus go to a Tesla gallery and do everything traditionally associated with the purchase of a car,
then transact online to complete the sale with Tesla in California, and then take delivery of the car
in Michigan.
5. The Failure of HB 6233 and Implications
The Tesla settlement wasn’t a special deal for Tesla, which the Attorney General
would not have had authority to make. Rather, it was a general interpretation of Michigan law.
Under ordinary legal principles, any company situated like Tesla—which would include at least

https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/Joint_Stipulation_and_Motion_for_Entry_of_Dismissal_1-2220_679161_7.pdf.

9
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any EV manufacturer not distributing through franchised dealers—could take advantage of the
same terms. The Tesla settlement thus opened the door for companies like Rivian, Lucid,
Lordstown, Bollinger, and Nikola to sell and service in Michigan.
The car dealers’ lobby was not happy about the prospect that the new generation of
car companies would bypass them entirely.

In September of 2020, the Michigan House

Government Operations Committee took up a bill—H.B. 6233—proposed by the dealers to make
sure that no EV company other than Tesla could take advantage of the settlement. The bill included
a new and expansive definition of “sell” and “selling” that included virtually every activity
associated with new vehicle sales transactions, including those that Tesla’s settlement with the
State recognize are not sales under the existing statute. It added the phrase “directly or indirectly”
to the prohibition on manufacturer ownership of motor vehicle service and repair facilities, which
would make it impossible for a new car manufacturer to do what the State agreed that Tesla can
do—own a subsidiary performing service in Michigan. The bill would have shut down the
possibility of interpreting Michigan law in the way the Attorney General interpreted it when
settling with Tesla. In addition to making these substantive amendments to the existing statute, the
Bill made clear that it applied to all manufacturers, all new dealer agreements, and all existing
dealer agreements. But it then went on to make a special carve out for any “manufacturer that
entered into a joint stipulation and motion for entry of dismissal” in the Tesla litigation and has
not sold a single new motor vehicle in the state through a franchised dealer. Such entities could
perform a list of enumerated activities, which corresponded directly to the activities that Tesla and
the State agreed that Tesla could perform pursuant to the settlement. In other words, the bill
doubled down on the existing restrictions on direct sales and service by manufacturers, but then
enacts a single-company carve out to preserve the terms of Tesla’s settlement with the State.
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The bill was vigorously opposed in Committee by EV start-ups like Rivian and
Lucid, environmental groups like the Sierra Club and the Environmental Council, the Mackinac
Center, GM, Ford, and the UAW. It nonetheless passed the Committee on a 3-1-1 party-line vote.
H.B. 6233 was almost certainly unconstitutional under Article IV, Section 29 of the
Michigan constitution, which prohibits “special acts” favoring a single company. 10 But what
happened next made things matters even worse: When the bill reached a floor vote on December
2, 2020, a floor amendment stripped out the Tesla exemption. This moved GM, Ford, and UAW
to neutral on the bill (what they most opposed was carving a special exemption for Tesla into law),
and provided enough political cover for the bill to pass in the House. But the bill now doubled
down on making Michigan the most restrictive state in the Union on direct sales and service by
broadly defining “sales” to include almost any activity an EV company might have taken in the
State. Moreover, it blew up the Tesla settlement and would have barred even Tesla from Michigan
sales and service. That, in turn, would have re-upped Tesla’s original constitutional challenge,
with the very real prospect that a federal court rather than the Legislature would determine how
cars could be sold and serviced in Michigan.
Fortunately, the Senate never took up H.B. 6233, and it died with the expiration of
the legislative session. Where that leaves things is exactly as they stood as of January 2020: Any
EV company similarly situated to Tesla can, in principle, sell and service directly in Michigan,
subject to the requirement of executing the sales transaction and titling out state and operating
service centers through subsidiaries.

10

https://profdancrane.files.wordpress.com/2020/09/hb-6233-white-paper-.pdf.
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COSTS OF PRESENT REGULATORY SCHEME
The regulatory status quo in Michigan is considerably better than in was before the
January 2020 Tesla settlement, but it is far from optimal. As revealed in the last legislative session,
the car dealers are continuing to push for legislative reforms that would blow up the Tesla
settlement and destroy the opportunity for direct distribution in Michigan, codifying mid-twentieth
century distribution practices for the twenty-first century. Moreover, even if the Tesla settlement
remains intact, it does not seem to permit direct sales by legacy car companies like GM, Ford, and
Chrysler, which could put them at a severe competitive disadvantage in the new world of EVs.
Finally, by forcing the formal sales and titling transaction to occur outside of Michigan, the current
structure threatens to lead to a significant economic losses to the State of Michigan.
1. EV Market Penetration
As noted earlier, EV companies have made a strong case that traditional dealer
distribution is not viable for EVs. Adding to the set of reasons offered earlier by Tesla, Rivian
testified at the H.B. 6233 hearings that direct sales and servicing are vital to EV companies whose
business and technological model relies on a close and ongoing relationship with their customers.
For example, Rivian will give its customers the option to have their vehicle’s performance
continuously monitored over-the-air by Rivian, with the company able to offer customers
immediate feedback and assistance with respect to vehicle performance. That sort of relationship
requires a direct and close relationship between the company and its customers. Similarly, much
of the servicing for EVs will occur through over-the-air software updates, which again assumes a
direct relationship between company and customer.
To be clear, no one is arguing that it is impossible to sell EVs through traditional
dealers. At the hearings on H.B. 6233, several members of the Committee related that they had

14
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796359

15

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 177 [2021]

purchased an EV from a dealer. However, that a highly motivated customer may be able to
purchase an EV from a franchised dealer does not mean that dealer distribution will be nearly as
effective at advancing EV market penetration or providing customers with optimal sales and
service experiences. To the contrary, there is empirical evidence that most dealers are not highly
motivated to sell EVs. Consumer Reports sent secret shoppers to 85 dealerships that did stock
some EVs. 11 It found that 13 out of the 85 dealers actively discouraged customers from buying an
EV, and 35 more recommended buying an internal combustion car instead. The dealers seemed
uniformed about EVs, had few in stock, and had few options or choices on the ones they had. “A
sales manager at Manhattan Ford in New York City, the only Ford dealership actually owned by
the automaker, at first denied there was a Focus EV, and then said it couldn’t be leased. Both
statements are incorrect.” At another dealership, the dealer wouldn’t even show the secret shopper
an EV, even though they had one in stock. Given the economic disincentives dealers have to sell
EVs (discussed above), none of this should be surprising. Recently, 150 Cadillac dealers accepted
buy-outs instead of agreeing to start selling EVs. 12
That the current franchised dealer model is ill-suited for EV sales does not mean
that dealers cannot be effective players in the world of EV sales and service. However, for them
to do so requires a fundamental change their business model. Some dealerships are wisely
beginning to understand this and look for new ways to interact with car companies and their
customers to provide value in the very different EV world. In that world, car distribution and
service will look little like it did in 1950. Trying to lock EV distribution in the 1950s model will
only serve to slow EV market penetration, to the disadvantage of Michigan’s consumers and

https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/dealers-not-always-plugged-in-about-electric-cars-secretshopper-study-reveals/index.htm
12
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/04/about-150-cadillac-dealers-take-gm-buyouts-rather-than-invest-in-evs.html.
11
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society at large. It will also disadvantage American car companies trying to compete with EV
manufacturers around the world—the sorts of distribution limitations at issue in the United States
are not usually seen in the rest of the world.
2. Environmental Impacts
Slowing the market penetration of EVs also has undesirable environmental
consequences.

Internal combustion engine ears and trucks account of one-fifth of carbon

emissions in the United States. The faster the transition to EVs, the faster the reduction in the
automotive sector’s contribution to carbon emission. For this reason, a coalition of environmental
organizations, including the Sierra Club, Environmental Council, Electrification Coalition,
Ecology Center, E2, Plugin America, and Cleanfuels Michigan are actively working to promote
EV direct distribution. These organizations understand that laws restricting direct distribution are
major impediments to more people driving EVs, and have therefore made removing these
restrictions a policy priority.
3. Consumer Choice and Consumer Protection
Although the dealers’ lobby has tried to advance a consumer protection rationale
for direct distribution prohibitions, that argument has no support in the history of the dealer
franchise laws or in economics. The direct distribution laws were passed to protect dealers, not
consumers. Every consumer advocacy organization that has weighed in on the issue—including
the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Reports, Consumer Action, Consumers for
Auto Reliability and Safety, and the American Antitrust Institute—has taken the position that bans

16
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796359

17

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 177 [2021]

on direct sales are bad for consumers and that direct sales should be allowed. 13 Economists and
academic experts on competition policy have uniformly taken the same position. 14 There is no
consumer protection reason to ban direct sales, and every reason to permit consumers to make up
their own minds about how they buy their cars.
In the last legislative session, the dealers argued that preventing other companies
from taking advantage of the Tesla settlement was necessary from a consumer protection
perspective because, otherwise, vehicle sales would go “unregulated.” What they apparently
meant was that, since the sales transaction would occur outside of Michigan, the sales entity would
not be a dealer licensed in Michigan and subject to Michigan consumer protection regulations.
This argument is perverse. The only reason that the sales transaction has to be sent outside of
Michigan is that the dealers themselves procured the 2014 legislative amendments that prevented
Tesla from getting a Michigan dealer’s license. While it’s not true that the sale transaction is
unregulated (the sales transaction is regulated in the state where it occurs), the EV companies
would be very happy to get a Michigan dealer’s license and be fully regulated in Michigan, just
like any other dealer. The appropriate response to this fabricated problem of “unregulated sales”
is not to ban direct sales, but to allow EV companies to get a dealer license—exactly what they are
asking for.
4. Threats to the Free Market
The coalition of groups supporting a car company’s right to sell and service its cars
directly includes the strange bedfellows of environmental, consumer, and free market groups like

https://www.autonews.com/assets/PDF/CA98362217.PDF;
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-regarding-michigan-senatebill-268-which-would-create-limited-exception-current/150511michiganautocycle.pdf.
14
See, e.g., https://profdancrane.files.wordpress.com/2020/09/academics-letter-opposing-hb-6233-1.pdf
13
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the Mackinac Center, Americans for Prosperity, and Institute for Justice. 15 Free market groups
oppose direct sales bans on principle: why should the government tell a willing car company and
a willing consumer that they cannot transact directly? Such bans may serve the dealers economic
interests, but protecting some special interest group from competition is not a sound basis for law.
Indeed, it is unconstitutional. 16
5. Economic Impacts for the State of Michigan
a. Lost Sales Tax Revenues
The State of Michigan collects a 6% sales tax on vehicle sales. If a Michigan
resident purchases a vehicle outside the State of Michigan and then brings it back to Michigan and
registers it here, whether Michigan collects a sales tax—and in what amount—depends on whether
the other state has a tax reciprocity agreement with Michigan. 17 Where Michigan has a tax
reciprocity agreement with another state, there is no loss of tax revenue to Michigan from out-ofstate purchase and titling by a resident, since the other state remits either the full 6% tax to
Michigan, or, if it collects a lower sales tax amount, it remits the amount collected and Michigan
collects the balance up to a total of 6% upon registration in Michigan. However, if the other state
collects a sales tax on the sale and does not have a reciprocity agreement with Michigan, “credit
is given for any sales or use tax that is legally due and paid in another state at the time of
purchase.” 18

https://www.autonews.com/assets/PDF/CA98362217.PDF.
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a “measure to privilege certain businessmen
over others at the expense of consumers is not animated by a legitimate governmental purpose and cannot survive
even rational basis review”).
17
http://msdra.com/out_of_state_buyersales_tax.htm.
18
https://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43519_43529-154427--,00.html.
15
16
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At present, a quarter of other states do not have reciprocity agreements with
Michigan. This means that Michigan stands to lose significant vehicle sales tax revenues if
Michigan residents are forced to buy and title EVs out of state. Annually, Michigan new vehicle
sales taxes account for around $1 billion, or about 10% of the State’s tax revenues. 19 EV sales are
bound to grow significantly as a share of the market in coming years. As a back-of-the-envelope
exercise, consider the quickly approaching year in which out-of-state EV sales hit 20% of the
market. If Michigan lost sales tax revenues in proportion to the number of states without
reciprocity agreements, this would mean a loss of 25% of $200 million, or $50 million in tax
revenues. At 40% EV market penetration, the number would grow to $100 million in lost tax
revenues.
Those assumptions may be understated because they assume other states continue
to maintain reciprocity agreements with Michigan. It is far from certain that they will if Michigan
remains an outlier on direct sales. The instinct behind reciprocity agreements is that, on average,
equal numbers of non-residents buy cars in the compacting states so that, on average, the
reciprocity agreements are revenue-neutral. But, as EV sales grow, if Michigan maintains a
prohibition on direct distribution, other states will find it to their advantage to encourage titling in
their own state and associated collection of sales taxes. Unless Michigan updates its vehicles sales
laws, it could soon find itself with significantly dwindling motor vehicle tax revenues and a serious
hit to its sales tax revenue base. 20

https://autoalliance.org/in-your-state/MI/pdf/?export.
It is also possible that the current regulatory scheme would lead to a loss of corporate income tax revenue.
Michigan collects a 6% corporate income tax based on sales in Michigan. https://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7238-43519_59553_69155-265028--,00.html. Sales of tangible personal property, such as cars, are deemed to occur
in Michigan if the vehicle is shipped to or delivered to a customer in Michigan. MCL 208.1305(1)(a). Even though
the party consummating the sale might be a different corporate entity than the Michigan subsidiary performing retail
operations in Michigan, Michigan treats affiliated groups of taxpayers as a single business group, hence, in
principle, a sale from a foreign corporation to a Michigan resident should count for income tax purposes as a sale in
Michigan if the car is going to be delivered in Michigan. Nonetheless, the Attorney General’s interpretation of
19
20
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b. Lost Franchise Fees, Property Taxes, Local Investment, and Employment
In addition to these lost sales tax revenues, by requiring car companies wishing to
make direct EV sales to locate their sales facilities out of state, Michigan’s regulatory scheme will
reduce the physical presence of sales centers in Michigan and thereby deprive the state and local
governments from collecting a variety of other taxes and fees such as franchise registration fees
and property taxes. Prohibiting car companies from locating sales operations in Michigan will
lead to a loss of local investment and jobs. A company selling EVs to Michigan residents would
be forced to locate all of the operations supporting those transaction in another state. So, for
example, an employee handling titling and financing for Michigan residents might be located in
California rather than Michigan. That would represent the loss of a Michigan job and all that goes
with it—the physical office space (real estate investments or leasing), local spending supporting
that employee’s activities, income taxes paid by the employee, and the economic and social
benefits that come from bringing productive people to the State.
c. Negative Impact on Michigan’s Reputation as an Automotive Innovation Hub
A final factor is less tangible, but perhaps even more significant in the long run.
For many years, Michigan has been fighting negative publicity and popular impressions about the
Michigan car industry and to restore is reputation as the car capital of the world. Governor Whitmer
has called for Michigan to play a leading role in bold and transformative thinking about
automobiles and mobility technology. 21 The Governor’s Office of Future Mobility seeks to
reaffirm “Michigan’s position as the global leader in producing and developing the next-generation

Michigan law raises questions about how a sale outside of Michigan to a Michigan resident should be treated for
interstate revenue allocation purposes. Given that Michigan law prohibits the sale to incur “in Michigan” for
purposes of the dealer law, corporations might be successful in arguing that the sale does not incur “in Michigan”
for purposes of the tax law either. If so, the result would be a significant loss of corporate tax revenue, in addition to
the loss of sales tax revenue.
21
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90487-498358--,00.html.
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of transportation technologies.” 22 Among the State’s goals are increasing mobility investment in
Michigan, engaging more mobility startups, accelerating EV adoption in Michigan, and bolstering
Michigan’s mobility manufacturing core.
But, to put it mildly, maintaining a set of dated prohibitions on innovation in
automobile distribution that are badly out of step with emerging standards around the country does
not project a good image for Michigan. In 2014, the legislative reforms targeted at stopping Tesla
from selling in the state was covered negatively in the media across the country and around the
world. For example, the Wall Street Journal ran a national editorial condemning Michigan for
technological backwardness 23 and the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation named
Michigan one of four winners of its dreaded “Luddite Award.” 24
Already, a number of EV start-ups have made significant investments in Michigan,
with Rivian’s headquartering in Plymouth perhaps the most salient example. Attracting continuing
investments by these and other companies requires projecting a positive environment for
innovation in the way cars are designed, built, sold, and serviced. Restricting the right of a
manufacturer to sell and service its vehicles in ways that meet its business needs sends exactly the
wrong signal. American EV start-ups like Tesla, Rivian, Lordstown, Lucid, and Bollinger have
made it clear that they view the right to transact directly with their customers as being critical to
the success of their products. Michigan should be leading the way in fostering an environment in
which car manufacturers can experiment with varied distribution and servicing models.

https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90640-533468--,00.html.
Rick Snyder Drives off the Road: Michigan's Pro-Market Governor Embraces the Car Dealer Cartel, W ALL
STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2014, 7:18 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/rick-snyder-drives-off-the-road-1414192688.
24
Robert Sorokanich, Gov. Snyder's Anti-Tesla Law Wins Michigan the “Luddite Award”, CAR & DRIVER (Jan. 8,
2015, 10:23 AM), http://blog.caranddriver.com/gov-snyders-anti-tesla-law-wins-michigan-the-luddite-award.
22
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POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
If there’s one thing that almost everyone on all sides of the issue agrees on, it’s that
the status quo on vehicle direct sales and service in Michigan is not optimal. It’s time for the issue
to be considered systematically, openly, and with input from all stakeholders. Legislative reform
is needed, not just to slap a patch on the problem, but to the lay foundation for a fair, rational, and
successful system of vehicle sales and service in the car industry’s incipient technological and
economic revolution.
For those favoring reforms to allow direct EV sales and service, there are two
potential flavors of reform legislation:
•

Model 1: Manufacturers selling only EVs licensed as dealers.

•

Model 2: Any manufacturer selling EVs licensed as a dealer for purposes
of EV sales and service.

Model 1, which is similar to legislation adopted in Colorado, would essentially
codify the Tesla settlement by allowing EV start-ups to sell and service directly, with the important
caveat that they would be licensed as dealers in Michigan, obviating the need to conduct the sales
and titling transaction out of state, with all of the associated economic costs to Michigan.
However, this model would not permit legacy companies like GM, Ford, and Chrysler to conduct
direct sales and service.
Model 2 would allow the legacy companies to join the EV start-ups in selling and
servicing EVs directly, even while maintaining dealer distribution for internal combustion
vehicles. While there is no plausible dealer protection objection to Model 1 since it would not
implicate any dealer in an existing franchise relationship, the dealers might have some standing to
complain that allowing their franchising manufacturers to sell EVs directly would be unfair. Any
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such argument would be weak. The legacy companies have sold relatively few EVs to date, and
the dealers could protect themselves contractually against egregious exploitation or find new ways
to add value in a hybrid distribution system.
In my view, Model 2 is preferable to Model 1 because it would allow the legacy
companies to compete on a level playing field with the EV start-ups. In 2014, when Tesla and the
dealers negotiated the previously mentioned legislative deal allowing Tesla to open three stores in
Ohio, GM wrote a letter to Governor Kasich complaining that allowing Tesla “would gain a
distinct competitive advantage” from being able to sell direct. 25 Unfortunately, GM’s demand was
to close the door to direct sales for Tesla, not to open it for GM. GM was right that direct sales
represent a competitive advantage—this White Paper has argued that, for EV sales, it is not just
an advantage, it is critical. The law should not pick winners and losers. Direct sales and service
should be available for any company selling EVs.
CONCLUSION
Michigan has an opportunity to show its leadership on the future of car distribution
and automotive technology by passing reform legislation that protects the car dealers’ legitimate
reliance interests in the distribution system for internal combustion vehicles, but also recognizes
the very different demands of EV distribution. It’s time to allow EV manufacturers and consumers
to experiment with new distribution models that allow greater flexibility and freedom in how cars
are bought and sold.

25

https://insideevs.com/photo/3934484/general-motors-sends-anti-tesla-direct-sales-letter-to-ohio-governor/.
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